Tom Barry
In the days leading up to the ambush at Crossbarry (March 19th, 1921) British forces were still on the increase as there was a growing need for their presence in the area. A document later captured by the I.R.A. showed that there were 8,800 front line infantry troops, 1150 Black and Tans, 540 Auxiliaries, 2080 machine gun corps, artillery and other units, a total of over 12,500 men. There was also the additional RIC (armed) police force. The Irish Army Volunteers had acquired arms over many months through ambushes and the men of the 3rd West Cork Brigade received training from their commandant general Tom Barry. Barry had served in the British army during The Great War and had strong republican ideals. Barry soon proved himself as a very able commander, fighting for Irish independence and carrying out many ambushes and assaults on the occupation forces, who carried out strict reprisals for such attacks and harassed the local population on a continual basis. The 3rd Brigade operated as a flying column with a single leader and drew its volunteers from the local population. Due to their ability to operate completely independently from other flying columns, the British were finding it hard to break these groups down. By March 1921 the 3rd West Cork flying column had 104 officers and men, armed with rifles or revolvers with approximately 36-40 rounds per man. The column was split into 7 sections of 7 men each commanded by a section commander each. These were Sean Hales, John Lordan, Mick Crowley, Dennis Lordan, Tom Kelleher, Peter Kearney and Christy O’ Connell. Columns such as this relied on local sympathies to stay operational which lead to reprisals for anyone harbouring volunteer forces.
The British relied heavily on intelligence and sources had located the whereabouts of the column on the 16th and sent a reconnaissance plane to investigate. The British then set out quickly to circle the column. The IRA’s counter intelligence later reported British troop movements on the 19th to the area at roughly 1 a.m.; 400 left Cork, 200 left Ballincollig, 300 left Kinsale, 350 left Bandon, 120 Auxiliaries later left Macroom and still later more left Clonakilty and Cork. Sources one and two agree on this information however it is arguable whether such large professional forces of the British Army could have been deterred by just over 100 volunteers. However investigation into the ambush reveals how this came about.
At 2.30 a.m. while billeting at Ballyhandle, Barry received reports from his men of lights and lorries some miles to the west. 2 more reports came in simultaneously of enemy movements to the east and of lights and dogs barking to the south. Barry quickly came to the conclusion that they were to be surrounded and needed a quick break out of the encirclement as their lack of manpower and ammunition did not permit a prolonged engagement. Some of the British units dismounted and proceeded on foot to raid the surrounding country houses. It was in one of these raids 3 miles north of Crossbarry in which the British came across the wounded Charles Hurley who was recovering from a bullet wound received in a previous ambush (Upton ambush). He was killed at roughly at 6.30 a.m. by officers of the 1st Essex but was reported to have killed one and wounded two in the process. By this time Barry had the column in position to ambush British forces to the west as reports had suggested they were much closer than the other encircling troops and so could be engaged on their own. Barry had sent a pair of volunteers to retrieve Charlie when the first reports of the British in the area came to him but these men were subsequently captured.
Barry’s ambush was meticulously organised. Mines were laid down by Capt. McCarthy, who had served in the Royal Engineers. Two small stone walls were built along the ambush site to prevent armoured cars from infiltrating the I.R.A. lines, as the volunteers could not deal with such an armoured threat directly if it were to come due to their sole possession of small arms. The ambush site was chosen west of the double crossroads at Crossbarry. The old Cork-Bandon road runs from west to east and is met by two roads running north-south creating a double crossroads 30 yards apart. All seven sections were posted west of these crossroads. Hales’ Section was placed N of the road on the west side in a ditch which ran along the road. This was capable of moving in behind the British once the ambush started. Christy O’ Connell’s Section was situated 600 yards west of Hales’ and was responsible for holding the right flank as it was the western most section. The four Sections belonging to the two Lordans, Crowley, and Kearney were posted east of Hales’ Section at two farmhouses along the road side. The last Section was that of Tom Kelleher placed in a field 600 yards to the rear of the four main Sections of the ambush. The mines were placed between these four sections. Three riflemen were detached from these four Sections and placed a half mile to the rear to delay enemy flank manoeuvres and prevent the enemy sneaking up on the column. It also provided the main ambushers with time to redeploy to face a new threat. So according to Barry, there were now 73 officers and men in the main ambush sector with 31 others protecting flanks and the rear. In addition to this, Flor Begley, an Intelligence Officer, brought had his pipes and was instructed to play traditional Irish war songs on his pipes in the farmyards among the main ambush force. Barry gave strict orders that no volunteer was to show himself until the fighting had begun. In addition to his no Section was to come to the aid of those fighting unless ordered, even if they themselves were not engaged, as the enemy was approaching fast from all directions and would infiltrate the column if this were to happen. Communication between Barry and his Sections was made via runners and the command post was between the centre Sections.
At 8 a.m. the convoy from the west approached, however a volunteer in the central farm houses exposed himself briefly and the British immediately saw an ambush and opened fire. The ambush had begun as Flor Begley’s pipes began to ring through the air. The fire fight was predominantly at less than ten yards due to the ambushers’ positions. The British soldiers confused and disorganised were routed quickly, running to the south across the fields. Three Sections were detached to pursue but returned after according to Barry felling “many men”. Barry had now the option to escape the noose as the west side had been obliterated but now stayed to engage the other British forces. The enemy arms and ammunition was seized along and an Irish hostage by the name of Edward White rescued. According to General Strickland hostages were often taken along as means of deterring an ambush. This apparently had no effect given the current situation.
The order to destroy the lorries was given and three were in flames when fighting broke out on the left flank. After brief intense fighting the British soldiers withdrew due to the strategic advantage of the defenders’ position. Following this fire broke out on the right flank, where apparent British raiding parties were taken surprise by O’ Connell’s Section as the British advanced cross country. These units also withdrew. Ten minutes later a British unit of 200 (according to Barry and Ryan) arrived to the flank at Tom Kelleher’s Section. Creeping along a ditch they had hoped to hit the column from behind, which would surely have caused chaos in the column. However Barry’s strategic positioning of Kelleher’s Section, who did not move despite seeing no action until this point, were waiting for the British. Allowing the British to come within fifty yards, they opened fire and these British units retreated after Barry had sent Jim “Spud” Murphy with eleven additional riflemen to reinforce this position. Barry then extended his men northwards to meet a possible flanking action from the British which came but was quickly repulsed.
Barry then moved the whole column except O’ Connell’s Section to Tom Kelleher’s position to rid the enemy of the rear and by the time Barry himself at arrived the enemy had retreated. The I.R.A. laid out their dead and the order to move out was given. Shortly following this a group of apparently disorganised British soldiers were spotted in a field discussing what to do some distance away in a field. Barry ordered all 100 rifles of the column to take aim and fire three volleys. These few soldiers “broke in all directions”. This was the last of the fighting of the ambush and the column moved off and leaving the scene of the ambush, began the 20 mile march to their next billets in the country side to continue their fight for independence.
In all according to Barry and Ryan the I.R.A. had lost three volunteers, Jeremiah O’ Leary, Con Daly and Peter Monahan. However according to Meda Ryan, Peter Monahan was not his correct name, a British solder with Irish parents from Fermoy, he defected to the I.R.A. and “will forever remain the unknown soldier”. In addition to this Charles Hurley, a leading figure of the column and great friend of Tom Barry’s was killed and two further volunteers were taken prisoner. Barry describes the British losses as, “corpses strewn on the Crossbarry road, in the fields south of it, in front of Dennis Lordan’s Section, near Christy O’ Connell’s Setion and now here were several more of them lying around Kelleher’s position”. This seems slightly exaggerated compared to Hamar Greenwood (source three) and his figures of six I.R.A. men injured and seven wounded and six taken prisoner (some were also taken in the house raids prior to the ambush). The I.R.A. did in fact have injured and Greenwood’s figures can only be derived from AARs (after action reports), however are not far off Barry’s figures. In addition the British controlled the ambush site following the columns departure and so could report accurately their own losses. This together with the official report to the British Cabinet can be looked upon with relative assurance when they report their own losses of, “eight (other ranks) soldiers and one policeman killed and five wounded (three officers and two other ranks) with one policeman being injured”.
This is seen as a sure victory for the I.R.A. of west Cork and was an “overdue strategic necessity” according to Barry, because had they not been attacked they would have continued to harass the population and arrest volunteers, thus reducing morale and interfering with the operations of the volunteers. Indeed it was described as Barry in a later interview as being “possibly a decisive factor in getting the British establishment to think of a truce”. It was also known that Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain had singled out the ambushes of Kilmichael and Crossbarry in communiqués leading up to a truce. The ambush was decisive in showing how independent fighting elements backed by a local population were extremely hard to gain intelligence on and their ability to mingle with the population and move around the area in which they knew all the terrain very well could be superior to that of the British Army. Barry’s command skills also played a decisive role in defeating the British as his expectation of British Army tactics allowed him to reply and repel their attacks. The British surely would have had the notion that there were many more volunteers than there was in reality. In an article published by the New York Times and associated press there were reports of up to 300 volunteers taking part in the ambush. General Strickland commented on the ambush saying “if the outcome had been successful {British prospective} it might easily have had decisive results as regards rebel activity in West Cork”.
The Crossbarry Ambush
The Crossbarry Ambush
The Crossbarry Ambush
